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Jennifer E. Markiewicz
"In a case... in which Congress has not plainly marked
our course, we must be circumspect in construing the
scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which
never contemplated such a calculus of interests."
1
INTRODUCTION
Copyright infringement in cyberspace is not a
primary concern for most internet users.2 Photos,
music, software and video images are freely
swapped online with seemingly litfle thought
given to the proprietary rights attached to them.
This explosion of information dissemination on
the internet, coupled with an ever-increasing au-
dience literate in its use, has wreaked havoc on
the underlying principles of copyright enforce-
ment. Arguably, the invention of Gutenberg's
printing press pales in comparison to the conse-
1 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
431 (1984).
2 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-38 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (discussing cyberspace, the Internet and access meth-
ods). The Internet is the vast collection of interconnected
networks that all use TCP/IP protocols and that evolved from
the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects
Agency Network (ARPANET) of the late 1960's and early
1970's. See id at 831. Over 16 million host computers existed
on the Internet as of January 1997, representing access to
more than 175 countries and 40 million users. See KEVIN
WERBACH, OPP WORKING PAPER No. 29, DIGITAL ToRA'o:
THE INTERNET AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, 21-22.
(1997). With the estimated number of users doubling every
200 days, the number of users is expected to have reached
well over 100 million by 1998. See Barbara Esbin, Internet Over
Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, 7 COMMLAw CON-
SPECTUS 37, 46 (1999) [hereinafter Esbin].
3 See generally 17 U.S.C. §504. A copyright owner may
choose to recover either actual damages plus any additional
profits of the infringer or statutory damages not less than
$500 or more than $20,000 for each act of infringement,
though the court may in its discretion increase the award of
damages to not more than $100,000 per each willful infring-
ing act. See 17 U.S.C. §504(c)(1)-(2). Due to the nature of
quences of the internet's ubiquitous reach. Un-
like publishers of printed material, it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to find Internet copy-
right infringers, let alone prosecute them.
Copyright infringement judgments have the po-
tential to be prodigious. 3 Thus, for copyright
owners seeking to enforce their rights in cyber-
space, the most logical choice of defendants has
been the online companies which provide the ser-
vice that facilitates the copyright infringement be-
cause of their "deep pockets." This is a logical as-
sumption considering that historically, the party
disseminating the copyrighted works, whether
knowingly or not, has been held liable.4 Booksell-
ers, theater owners, and storeowners traditionally
have all been held liable under copyright law.5
Cyberspace, however, raises new questions.
the Internet, actual damages to a copyright owner likely
would be indeterminable.
4 See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Communica-
tions Services, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stat-
ing that "direct infringement does not require intent or any
particular state of mind, although willfulness is relevant to
the award of statutory damages"); Playboy Enterprises v.
Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993). See also
Mary Ann Shulman, Internet Copyright Infringement Liability: Is
An Online Access Provider More Like a Landlord or a Dancehall
Operator? 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 555, 568 (1997) [here-
inafter Shulman]; Andrea Sloan Pink, Copyright Infringement
Post Isoquantic Shift: Should Bulletin Board Operators Be Liable?
43 UcLA. L. REv. 587, 618 (1995).
5 See Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Man-
agement, 443 F.2d 1162, 1163 (1971) (holding a concert pro-
vider liable for contributorily causing the infringing perform-
ance of a copyright holder's songs when performed by its
artists at local community concerts); Shapiro Bernstein & Co.
v. H.L. Green, 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2nd Cir. 1963) (holding
that since the infringing party had a concession to operate a
record store in defendant's department stores, the store-
owner was vicariously liable for sale of bootleg records);
Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d
354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929) (holding a dance hall operator lia-
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Regulation on the Internet in and of itself is a
complicated and controversial subject, and con-
ventional legal principles, including those of
copyright analysis, are simply incompatible with
the function of the network.6
Congress in 1996, seeking to limit online ser-
vice providers' liabilities, enacted the Communi-
cations Decency Act ("CDA") which exempted In-
ternet Service Providers ("ISPs") from slander and
libel caused by third parties. 7 The CDA was the
first statute to recognize the incongruity between
laws firmly ensconced in society and those suita-
ble for the virtual world of cyberspace .s
In 1998, Congress again sought to limit ISP lia-
bility through the Online Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation Act ("Title II")9 incorporated
in the larger Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA"). 10 Importantly, Title II does not alter
ble for infringing performance of copyrighted songs played
by the orchestra it hired because the dancehall stood to
make a profit from the performance).
6 See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65
U. CHI. L. REv. 1199 (1998) (discussing fundamental difficul-
ties regulating cyberspace using traditional tools of the law,
including jurisdiction, law enforcement, liability and the
challenges in creating a regulated structure).
7 See 47 U.S.C. §230.
8 See id. A "Good Samaritan" provision of the Communi-
cations Decency Act of 1996 stated that ISPs should not be
"treated as the publisher or speaker" of third party content
and cannot be held liable for slanderous or libelous material
posted on their services. See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online,
Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (granting tort immu-
nity for Internet Service Providers by Congress because of the
impossibility of screening millions of electronic postings for
problems). That provision, however, does not apply to intel-
lectual property issues. See 47 U.S.C. §230(e) (2) (stating that
tort immunity does not limit or expand any law pertaining to
intellectual property). Therefore, the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act "fills a legal gap left by the passage of the Com-
munications Decency Act in 1996." John Borland, Law Enlists
ISPs In Piracy Fight, CNET News.com (visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,28357,00.html>.
9 See Title II (Online Copyright Infringement Liability
Limitation Act) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§201-03, 112 Stat. 2877 (1998) (to be
codified at 17 U.S.C. §512).
10 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
304, 112 Stat. 2861 (1998). While the DMCA encompasses a
great deal more than the service provider liability limitations
found in Title II of the Online Copyright Infringement Act,
for the purposes of this Comment they are referred to as one
and the same. The DMCA also implements the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization's Copyright Treaty, a com-
puter maintenance repair or copyright exemption, the Col-
lections of Information Antipiracy Act, protection of certain
original designs, and other miscellaneous intellectual prop-
erty provisions.
11 See HOwARD COBLE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPY-
RIGHT ACr, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 72 (1998) [here-
the elements required to prove a copyright in-
fringement claim. It was intended to adjust the
basic principles of U.S. copyright law liability with
regard to ISPs.11
The DMCA's exemptions only apply to ISPs
when they perform certain functions, 12 discussed
in this Comment, including merely providing ac-
cess to the internet and temporarily storing vari-
ous forms of material on their equipment.1 3
Because both defending copyright infringe-
ment lawsuits and paying damages for copyright
infringement is extremely expensive, 14 attaining
service provider status under Title II is particu-
larly desirable. Further, distinguishing the various
service provider functions protected by Title II is
equally important. 15 The difficulty with Title II is
that Congress may have failed to adequately delin-
inafter REPORT].
Title II preserves strong incentives for service providers
and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal
with copyright infringements that take place in the digi-
tal networked environment. At the same time, it pro-
vides greater certainty to service providers concerning
their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in
the course of their activities.
Id. See also 17 U.S.C. §512 (a)-(d), (g).
12 See REPORT, supra note 11, at 72.
13 See Perkins Coie, Law Now Limits Liability for Certain On-
line Activities (visited Feb. 8, 1999) <http://www.Coiecoie.
com> [hereinafter Coie].
14 See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Sanfilippo, 97-0670-
lEG, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5125 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (finding
defendant liable for $3,737,500 in statutory damages for
uploading 7,475 copyright infringing images onto his web
site without permission). Id. at 9. Additionally, Sanfilippo
clarifies §504(c)(1) which defines "acts" of infringement. Id.
at 19. Under §504(c) (1), statutory damages may be awarded
"for all infringements involved in the action and that with
respect to any one work .... for purposes of this subsection,
all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute
one work." Id. See also 17 U.S.C. §504(c)(1). The question
existed as to whether each copied picture was an act of in-
fringement or whether each copied file containing numer-
ous pictures was an act of infringement. See Sanfilippo, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5125, at *13 n.2. The court held that "each
[picture uploaded by the defendant] had an 'independent
economic value' and is viable on its own .... Furthermore,
each image represents a singular and copyrightable effort
concerning a particular model, photographer and location."
Id. at 18. Simply because many of the images appeared to-
gether should not lessen the protection conveyed to each
separate effort. Id. See also Sega v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp.
923, 940 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (awarding costs per infringed work
for video games); Nintendo of America v. Dragon Pacific In-
ternational, 40 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 1994) (awarding large
statutory damages in addition to attorneys' :fees against copy-
right infringer).
15 See 17 U.S.C. §512 (a)-(d), (g).
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eate between what constitutes a "service provider,"
and what "functions" are protected.
A case in point involves the popular web site op-
erator and search engine, Lycos. 16 Lycos claims
that it is immune from copyright liability under
Title II for providing access to what are in reality
unauthorized transfers of copyrighted songs. 17
These songs are digitally transferred using a tech-
nology commonly known as MP3 (Motion Picture
Experts Group, Audio Layer 3), that allows music
files to be saved using very little computer storage
space while preserving nearly impeccable
sound.' 8 Next to searches for topics concerning
sex, MP3 files have become one of the most popu-
lar topics on the internet. 9
Specifically, Lycos argues that because it does
not physically store the MP3 files on its servers,
but merely provides the internet location of the
files, it does not violate the conditions of the Title
11.20 A closer examination of the statute's lan-
guage, however, raises questions as to (1) whether
Lycos qualifies as a service provider under Title II
and, if it does, (2) whether its function in facilitat-
ing MP3 file retrieval and exchange disqualify it
from protection.
Section I of this Comment briefly outlines the
recent history of copyright law focusing on the
different theories of liability and the parties impli-
cated by online copyright lawsuits. Specifically,
this section discusses ISPs and various internet
16 See Lycos Reports 2nd Quarter Revenues Up 142%
Over Last Year and 24% Over Last Quarter, BUSINESS WIRE,
Feb. 25, 1999 [hereinafter Lycos Revenues]. Lycos, Inc., an
international company headquartered in Waltham, Massa-
chusetts, owns the Lycos Network. See id. The company was
founded in 1995 and now operates as the second most popu-
lar hub on the internet. See id. On February 8, 1999, the
company entered into agreements with USA Networks, Inc.
and Ticketmaster Online-City Search, Inc. and, pending
stockholder approval, the merged companies will be called
USA/Lycos Interactive Networks, Inc. See id.
.17 But see Richard P. Klau, Recording Industry Sings the
Blues As Consumers Gain More Means To Make Their Own
Kind of Music, STUDENT LAWYER, Mar. 1999, at 17. The MP3
format itself is perfectly legal and is not only used by music
"pirates." Id: Many unsigned bands have started using the
format to distribute their music, easily and inexpensively. See
id. In fact, the operators of a website called "MP3.com" pro-
vide small bands the opportunity to sell their music to web-
site visitors by allowing them to add their music to its
archives. See id.
18 See MP3 for Beginners (visited Feb. 5, 1999) <http://
www.mp3.com/faq/general.html> [hereinafter Beginners].
MP3 (short for Motion Picture Experts Group, Audio Layer
3) files are typically identifiable because they will end in
".mp3." See id. The size of an MP3 file is typically 1 MB per
services they provide. Section II discusses the case
law that defined online service provider copyright
liability standards prior to the passage of the Title
II. Section III sets out the relevant portions of Ti-
tle II, specifically concentrating on the definition
of "service providers" and the "functions" that
they perform. Section IV outlines the copyright
liability issues that. have survived the legislation
and that will most likely continue to plague both
courts and the legislature as demonstrated by the
controversy over MP3. Section V concludes that
service providers specifically engaging in MP3. ac-
tivity are acting outside the scope of both caselaw
and Title II's limited liability provisions. As a re-
sut, they do not qualify for protection. Lastly,
this comment recommends a test for evaluating
whether a service provider is eligible for protec-
tion under Title II.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT
PROTECTIONS AND PURPOSES
To understand the scope of copyright law, it is
necessary to understand its mission: to balance so-
cietal interest in access to information against the
rights of the authors. 21 Copyright law provides in-
centives to ensure authors' continued creative
progress without fostering temporary monopolies
on those creations. 22
Beginning in England in 1476, the need to con-
minute of music. See id.
19 See L.A. Lorek, A Note of Interest: MP3 Technology
Changes Music on Web, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Feb.
28, 1999, at 4F (noting that over 600 IRC chat channels and
hundreds of websites are devoted to MP3 files).
20 See Chris Nelson, Lycos' Search Engine: Half-Million
Links, Lots of Kinks, SONICNET Music NEWS Or THE WORLD,
(visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.sonicnet.com/news/arti-
clel.jhtml?index=7>. A Lycos representative said it is not the
responsibility of the search engine to "vouch for the legality"
of the music it' directs users to by proving the music files are
copyrighted. See id.
21 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975). The Aiken Court described the Copyright Act as
a balancing mechanism. See id. The limited monopoly given
to reward copyright owners for their creations is carefully
weighted against the public interest to have access to such
works. See id. The Court concluded that ultimate motivation
for .copyright protected works ought to be the the public in-
terest derived from the fruits of artistic creativity. See id.
22 See Whelan Associates v.Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797
F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986). "The purpose of the copy-
right- law is to create the most efficient and productive bal-
ance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of in-
formation, to promote learning, culture and development."
Id.
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trol unauthorized reproductions was triggered by
the invention of the printing press. 23  Subse-
quently, the Framers recognized the importance
of this need in drafting the United States Consti-
tution which granted Congress the power to pro-
tect copyright owners.2 4 The most recent codifi-
cation of this power is the Copyright Act of 1976
("Copyright Act").25
Under the Copyright Act, copyright owners are
granted five exclusive rights, the violation of any
one of them constitutes infringement.26 An in-
fringing party under the Copyright Act may be
held directly liable. 27 To establish copyright in-
fringement, a plaintiff must prove two elements:
"(1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) copy-
ing of constituent elements of the work that are
original."28 Copying constitutes infringement if it
conflicts with one of the specific exclusive rights
conferred by the Copyright Act.29
Technology has proven to be a continuous chal-
lenge for legislators attempting to preserve the ba-
23 See ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPY-
RIGHT FOR THE NINETIES: CASES & MATERIALS, 1-4 (1993)
[hereinafter Gorman] (outlining the historical development
of intellectual property from the Reformation to the United
States colonial era).
24 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (stating "to promote
the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."). See also David N.
Weiskopf, The Risks of Copyright Infringement on the Internet: A
Practitioner's Guide, 33 U.S.F.L. REv. 1, 10 n.38 (1998) [here-
inafter Weiskopf] (asserting that "in enacting a copyright law
Congress must consider .... two questions: First, how much
will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the
public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be
detrimental to the public?" Id. citing, H.R. Rep. No. 60-
2222, at 7 (1909)).
25 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat.
2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§500). The
first Copyright Act was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1909.
See Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
See also GORMAN, supra note 23, at 2.
26 See 17 U.S.C. §106(a).
27 See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT
LAw 9.1 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing what constitutes a prima
facie case for copyright infringement) [hereinafter LEAFFER].
28 Feist Publ'g Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S.
340, 361 (1991).
29 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 432-33. In Sony, the court dis-
cussed the sale of "copy equipment" ever violated the
holder's rights. See id. at 420. Congress granted to copyright
owners five exclusive rights which they may exercise or li-
cense: (1) reproduction of the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords; (2) preparation of derivative works; (3) distri-
bution of copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease
or lending; (4) performance of the work publicly; and (5)
display of the copyrighted work publicly. See 17 U:S.C. §106.
sic premise of the Copyright Act.30 Prior to the
recent amendments to the Copyright Act by Title
II, case law clumsily attempted to apply old stan-
dards to new problems. 31 Courts have struggled
to discover a nexus between copyright theories
that were intended to endure modern technology
and the situations that exist online. 32
Courts were confronted with determining the
Copyright Act's reach into the context of cyber-
space and applying it to the novel technology and
disparate parties responsible for disseminating in-
formation over the internet. As a result, in spe-
cific factual situations, parties who did not physi-
cally complete the infringing activities but were in
some way "related" to the direct infringers were
held indirectly liable for the infringement. 33
Under the theories of contributory and vicarious
liability, courts imposed liability on internet ser-
vice providers for the copyright infringement by
their users.34
30 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 11. Since the passage
of the first copyright act in 1790, Congress has repeatedly
amended copyright laws to reflect technological innovation
and progress. See id. See also Brian A. Carlson, Balancing the
Digital Scales of Copyright Law, 50 S.M.U. L. REv. 825, 828-45
(1997) (tracing the changes in copyright law resulting from
technological advancements as disparate as the printing
press, piano rolls and digital technology).
31 See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRA-
STRUCTURE, at 211 (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. The
Task Force found in some cases, only an explanation of the
law was required while in others, the rights constitute the
spirit of the copyright law but not the letter. See id. at 211-12.
In other cases, the need for new solutions was clear. See id.
"Even though the 1976 Copyright Act was carefully drafted to
be flexible enough to be applied to future innovations, tech-
nology has a habit of outstripping even the most flexible stat-
utes." Id at 211.
32 See Timothy L. Skelton, Comment, Internet Copyright In-
fringement and Service Providers: The Case for a Negotiated
RulemakingAlternative, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 219, 313 (1998)
[hereinafter Skelton]. Courts analyze the law's underlying
purpose when technology creates ambiguities in .the law. See
id. But when technology advances faster than the develop-
ment of the law, adapting the statutes to comply with the
law's principles becomes difficult and awkward at best, trig-
gering a need for change. See id.
33 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 15. The burden is sig-
nificant for plaintiffs attempting to establish direct infringe-
ments because the plaintiff must prove the required copying
for each alleged direct infringer and each claimed direct in-
fringement. See id at 14. Attempting to hold large numbers
of alleged online infringers liable is nearly impossible and
highly impractical because copying occurs on a mass scale.
See id.
34 See LEAFFER, supra note 27, at §9:20 (discussing contrib-
utory and vicarious infringement liability).
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A. The Three Theories of Copyright
Infringement Liability
1. Direct Liability
Successfully trying a case of direct copyright in-
fringement requires the owner to prove: (1) valid
copyright ownership of a work; (2) the work was,
in fact, copied; and (3) the copying of work was
illegal under copyright laws. 3 5 A defendant's in-
tent or knowledge is not an element of direct in-
fringement. 36
In Mai Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,37 the
court held that works viewed and transmitted on
the internet are "copies" for the purposes of the
Copyright Act.38 While the absence of an intent
or knowledge requirement may lessen the burden
on copyright owners seeking to impose liability,
direct evidence of copying is often elusive. 39 This
is especially apparent in the realm of cyberspace
where often the parties responsible for the in-
fringement are impossible to find.40 For this rea-
son, imposing direct copyright liability in cyber-
space generally yields to alternative theories of
contributory and vicarious liability.41
2. Contributory Liability & Vicarious Liability
While the Copyright Act does not expressly im-
pose liability on anyone other than direct infring-
ers, courts have long recognized that, in certain
circumstances, liability for contributory infringe-
ment may be imposed.4 2 After establishing that
direct infringement occurred, the plaintiff must
35 See id. at §9.2.
36 See Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1559. The Frena court stated
that intent and knowledge are not required to prove direct
infringement and innocence is insignificant to determine
statutory damages. See id.
37 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
38 See id. at 518.
39 Evidence of direct copying is nearly impossible to col-
lect because defendants rarely admit copying a work. See
LEAFFER, supra note 27, at §9.3. Also, providing witnesses who
physically saw defendants copying the works is unlikely since
most copying is achieved privately through non-physical
means. See id. Extended to an online environment, this is
especially true because computer use is an individual activity
and most people using the Internet are acting individually.
See id.
40 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 16.
41 See id. at 26.
42 See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
261 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Sony 464 U.S. at 435). "Contribu-
tory copyright stems from the notion that one who directly
contributes to the infringing activity induces, causes or mate-
demonstrate that the defendant had knowledge
of the users' infringing activity and induced,
caused, or materially contributed to the infring-
ing activity.43 For example, in Playboy Enterprises,
Inc. v. Russ Hardenbaugh,44 a defendant electronic
bulletin board service ("BBS") operator was found
liable for contributory infringement because he
encouraged subscribers to upload information in-
cluding copyrighted adult-oriented files.45 When
Playboy sued the BBS operator for infringement
of hundreds of its images stored on his system,.the
district court held that because Playboy is one of
the most famous and widely distributed adult-ori-
ented publications, the defendant should have
been aware of infringing photos. 46
If the plaintiffs cannot prove defendants are
contributorily liable for their participation in the
infringing activity, they may still seek to prove vi-
carious liability, which focuses on the relationship
of the third party with the direct infringer.47
Courts have found vicarious liability for the ac-
tions of a primary infringer where the defendant:
(1) has the right and ability to control the in-
fringer's actions; and (2) receives a direct finan-
cial benefit.48 While several courts have endeav-
ored to interpret the language, substantive
definitions for "control" and "financial benefit"
have not been provided in the online context. 49
B. Distinguishing Between ISPs and ISP
Services
Determining who may be liable for copyright
rially contributes to the infringing conduct of another." Id.
(quoting Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Management, 443 F.2d 1162 (1971)).
43 See Sega Enterprises v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686
(N.D. Cal. 1994).
44 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
45 See id. at 514.
46 See id. at 515.
47 See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375 (citing Shapiro, Bern-
stein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co. 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir.
1963) and 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.04[A] [1], at 12-70.).
48 See id. at 1368.
49 See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. The Court in Fonovisa
found those leasing flea market space where pirated works
were sold financially benefited from the infringement be-
cause they received money from entrance fees and conces-
sion sales at the market. See id. Since the sale of infringing
material drew people to the flea market, a direct benefit was
derived from the activity. See id. The court expanded the
meaning of a direct financial benefit, which prior to this stan-
dard required a tangential relationship between the infring-
ing activity and the financial benefit. See id at 263.
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infringement as a service provider requires an un-
derstanding of the underlying internet technol-
ogy and how pirated content is traded. 50 Courts
have delineated three categories of ISPs on which
they have imposed copyright liability: BBSs, ISPs,
and Usenet operators. 5' However, there are nu-
merous additional categories of internet services
in existence that raise copyright liability questions
that are not addressed in either Title II or existing
case law.
5 2
The ISP category encompasses a wide variety of
participants in the industry. "Access providers"
and "content providers" are both grouped under
the ISP heading.53 Most internet services will fall
under one of these two headings. While all have
the capability of transferring MP3 files and are
thus able to facilitate infringement, as discussed
below, the problems each poses for enforcing
copyright rights differ because infringing activity
is more detectable on some services than others.
1. "Access Providers"
An access provider is a company that leases the
use of its computer facilities to connect a sub-
scriber to a regional network linked to the in-
ternet.54 Typically, access providers only provide
an entry through their servers to the internet net-
work.55 That is, they do not provide any content
whatsoever, but merely act as a conduit between
the user and the internet.
2. "Content Providers"
Content providers are generally commercial
services, such America Online, that provide both
content-based services and internet access
through private computer networks.56 Most con-
50 See Skelton, supra note 32, at 231-32.
51 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 7. (discussing which
parties should be responsible for copyright violations).
52 See Skelton, supra note 32, at 242-43. (noting that most
of the cases and commentaries regarding ISP liability fail to
clearly distinguish the differing roles that ISPs play in the
provision of the different internet services).
53 See Shulman, supra note 4, at 559.
54 See id. at 559 n.26.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See Giorgio Bovenzi, Liabilities of System Operators on the
Internet, 11 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 93, 98-99 (1996).
59 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dia-
logue On the Information Superhighway: The Case Against
tent services include news, commentary, feature
articles, sports and weather information automati-
cally updated from a wire service. 57 Other such
services described below may also include operat-
ing bulletin/message boards, hosting chat groups,
or establishing interactive discussion forums. 5
a. Electronic Bulletin Board Systems ("BBS")
BBSs are online services that allow subscribers
to exchange electronic messages (e-mail), text,
computer programs, photographs, music and
other forms of information. 59 The electronic bul-
letin board is one of the most popular services
available through the internet and other com-
puter services. More than 70,000 bulletin board
systems are estimated to be in operation world-
wide.60 A user uploads material from her com-
puter to make it available onto the bulletin
board.61 All subscribers have access to all bulletin
board messages, and any subscriber may
download the material to her computer. 62 The
largest bulletin board systems are operated by
commercial online services such as America On-
line, CompuServe, Microsoft, and Prodigy.63
Distinguishing between online services and
large electronic bulletin board services (BBS) is
not always easy. Most existing BBSs have a limited
number of users and function on small, single
phone-line personal computers operated by a sys-
tems operator ("Sysop") as a pastime with no
charge to users.64
b. Usenet
The Usenet is a decentralized worldwide system
of over 50,000 discussion groups65 arranged by
topic, 66 in which individual comments are passed
Copyright Liability for Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 346 n.5 (1995) [hereinafter El-
kin-Koren].
60 See Shulman, supra note 4, at 558 n.16
61 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 59, at 372 (discussing
uploading and downloading as copying under Sega).
62 See id.
63 See Shulman, supra note 4, at 559 n.26.
64 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 8 n.30 (citing A.
CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAw
(1994)).
65 See Michelle U. Rafter, Taming Newsgroups, INTERNET
WORLD, (Mar. 2, 1998). This is three times the number in
existence in 1995. See id.
66 See Kim Komando, Countless Topics of Discussion Cap-
tured in Usenet, ARIZONA BUSINESS GAZETTE, at 9 (Mar. 30,
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among hundreds of thousands of computers. 67 A
message posted on one Usenet server is automati-
cally and rapidly propagated to every other news
server in the Usenet worldwide system. 6 Only an
estimated one half of all Usenet computers are ac-
tually on the internet.6 9 Any computer file may
be converted into a text equivalent. Therefore,
many Usenet "messages" are actually encoded
computer programs, images, sound recordings,
and other types of computer files. 70
c. Other Online Services
Electronic mail ("e-mail") ,71 File Transfer Pro-
tocol ("FTP"), 7 2  the World Wide Web
("WWW"), 73 Search Engines7 4 and Internet Relay
Chat ("IRC") 7 5 are services available by accessing
1995).
67 See Matisse Enzer, Glossary of Internet Terms (visited Feb.
8, 1999) <http//:www.matisse.net/files/glossary.html> [here-
inafter Internet Glossay].
68 See Skelton, supra note 32, at 236. The daily volume
on Usenet has doubled every year and exceeded half a mil-
lion messages by February 1998. See id. at 237.
69 See Internet Glossary, supra note 67.
70 See Skelton, supra note 32, at 237.
71 See id. Potential for copyright abuse is limited in e-
mail because it is one-to-one communication. See id. Because
it is relatively simple to trace the copyright abuser, return ad-
dresses are usually attached to sent-message. See id.
72 See generally id. at 234. FTP is a file transfer service that
uses remote servers as a storage medium and usually main-
tains controlled access which requires a user name and pass-
word. See id. Some servers allow users to log on anonymously.
See id. Anonymous users are sometimes not allowed the abil-
ity to upload files. See id. Once connected, users may select
and download files using a server directory. See id. Copyright
abuse via FTP is common since the service is designed to
anonymously transfer large files. See id. at 234-35. Despite a
Sysop's efforts to detect pirated works by watching for suspi-
cious filenames, the sheer amount of files transferred
through the system prevents any effective blocking. See id.
73 See Skelton, supra note 32, at 240-41. The WWW is a
collection of documents stored on computers located world-
wide. Id. The opportunity for web page copyright abuse is
immense due to linking capabilities. See id. For example, the
pages can directly link to FTP servers, supply tools to defeat
copy protection systems, or provide detailed instructions on
how to locate and download pirated works from other in-
ternet services. See id. On the other hand, like e-mail, web
pages are not difficult to trace and for that reason are not
uncontrollable. See id. Additionally, because web pages may
only be modified by their author who is solely responsible for
its content, subscribers may be deterred from posting illegal
material. See id.
74 See Esbin, supra note 2, at 52. Search engines allow
users of the World Wide Web to search for specific informa-
tion among all public sites that comprise the Web with a sim-
ple keystroke or click of the computer "mouse." Id. Popular
search engines include "Yahoo," "Lycos" and "Magellan." Id.
traditional ISP servers. 76 With the exception of e-
mail and the WWW, each service provides a
means by which users may transfer files easily, and
in most cases anonymously, over the internet. 77
Among these, however, the most threatening ser-
vice for copyright owners seems to be the IRC.78
Danger exists in IRC for copyright owners for
several reasons, most significantly the service's an-
onymity and speed.7 9  Material may be quickly
posted, downloaded and removed before any
trace of the transaction is detected. 8 °
II. CASE LAW PRIOR TO TITLE II
.Attempts by the courts to import direct, con-
tributory and vicarious copyright liability theories
in cyberspace have been imprecise. 8' Early deci-
75 See "IRC FAQ" (visited Mar. 5, 1999) <http://www.
mirc.com/ircintro.html>. IRC stands for Internet Relay Chat
("IRC"). It is a multi-user chat system, where people meet on
"channels," usually with a certain topic of conversation, to
talk in groups or privately. See id. The largest one, referred
to as Efnet (Eris Free net), usually serves over 15,000 users at
any given moment operating over 2,000 channels. Id.
Smaller IRCs exist such as Undernet with 10,000 users and
Dalnet with 5,000 users. See id. "Although the IRC protocol
does not directly support file transfers, IRC is frequently used
to facilitate intellectual property theft using other internet
services." See Skelton, supra note 32, at 235.
76 See id. at 242.
77 See id.
78 See id. at 236 n.57. Transfers are normally conducted
with the use of IRC robots ("bots"), or programs that auto-
matically enable a user's computer, using the IRC channels,
to carry out various assignments. See id. Private connections
are created allowing a by-pass of safeguards against normally
unauthorized file transfers. See id. Essentially, the "bot" cre-
ates an illusion by tricking the systems into believe they are
functioning as an FTP host where files may be transferred.
See id. See alsoJohn C. Dvorak, MP3 Spells Disaster, PC MAGA-
ZINE, at 87, Mar. 9, 1999 (discussing Internet Relay Chat
["IRC"] as the "tip of the iceberg for potential bootlegging")
[hereinafter Dvorak].
79 See Skelton, supra note 32, at 231 n.41. Most users are
identifiable through an Internet Protocol ("IP") address. See
id. This address is usually assigned by the ISP to users each
time they log on. See id. However, this is not an effective
means of blocking access to infringers because ISPs purchase
blocks of "IP" addresses and recycle them to maintain the
efficiency of their networks. See id. Each time a user logs on,
he is randomly assigned an IP address that differs from the
last log-on. See id.
80 See Dvorak, supra note 78, at 87.
81 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 31-32, 36 (asserting that
courts have taken three different views of ISP contributory
infringement post-Fonovisa and that the current case law
lacks clarity with regard to determining whether a direct fi-
nancial benefit has been received by an ISP under vicarious
liability analysis).
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sions have reflected an attempt to force-fit old
copyright law to cyberspace, but increasingly
courts are quick to recognize the traditional
methods of analysis are not appropriate. Clearly,
the shift from direct liability for online service
providers to theories of indirect liability was the
initial major step to modernizing copyright law.
The first notable case to consider liability for di-
rect copyright infringement on the internet was
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena.82 A small BBS, op-
erated by Frena, was accused of automatically dis-
playing and distributing to its subscribers hun-
dreds of Playboy magazine photographs.8 3
Subscribers of Frena's BBS had uploaded files
containing digitized copies of the photographs
onto the BBS for other subscribers to access and
download.8 4 Despite the fact that Frena had abso-
lutely no participation in the uploading or
downloading of the photos, he was found directly
liable because he facilitated the exchange.8 5 The
fact that Frena removed the photos following no-
tification that they were unlawfully posted did not
alter the court's finding of guilt.86 Specifically,
the court stated: "[I]t does not matter that De-
fendant Frena may have been unaware of the
copyright infringement ..... .Intent or knowl-
edge is not an element of infringement, and thus
even an innocent infringer is liable for infringe-
ment."
87
After Frena, however, courts have tended to
avoid punishing service providers for activity oc-
curring on their services without their knowledge.
Focus of the courts has shifted to the defendant's
participation for a finding of infringement due to
the nature of cyberspace. 8  That is, unlike tradi-
tional notions of infringement that applied to the
82 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
83 See id. at 1554. Ultimately Frena was found liable. See
id. at 1559-63. Note that the court moved directly to evaluate
the violation of plaintiff's right to distribute the copyrighted
works where copyright liability exists after concluding the de-
fendant made the copies. See id. at 1555. The court did not
consider the plaintiff's right of reproduction. See id. See also
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370 (discussing criticisms of the
Frena decision).
84 Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1554.
85 See id. at 1559-63. While the court's ultimate decision
did not rely on the defendant's knowledge of infringing ac-
tivity, it clearly held him strictly liable. See id. Knowledge was
not an element. See id. It has been suggested that perhaps
the Court was influenced by evidence that the defendants did
know of the infringing activity. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1371 n.16.
actual act of copying by a person or his affiliates,
the technology operating the internet "automati-
cally operates to copy."89
Less than two years after Frena, a California dis-
trict court held in Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom Online Communications Services, Inc.90 that
internet access providers and BBS operators were
not directly liable for copyright infringement if
they merely served as conduits for unaltered infor-
mation, regardless of any infringing materials
stored on their computers.91 In Netcom, a user
posted his infringing materials to a BBS com-
puter, where they were temporarily stored and au-
tomatically copied to Netcom Online servers for
distribution to the Usenet. 92 Netcom Online as-
serted that it only provided internet access and
provided neither content nor exercised control
over material posted. 93 The BBS operator also as-
serted he had no control over the contents of
materials posted. 94
The Netcom court declined to hold either the
ISP or the BBS liable for direct infringement.95
This pivotal decision, which has served as the
foundation for both online copyright liability case
law and Title II, analogized the ISP's functions to
those of a copy machine. The Netcom court com-
pared the function of an ISP such as Netcom On-
line to "the owner of a copying machine who lets
the public make copies with it."96 While noting
that the Copyright Act is a strict liability statute,
the court concluded there is an implicit element
of "volition or causation which is lacking where a
defendant's system is merely used to create a copy
by a third party."9 7 The court recognized that
maintaining a strict liability standard would hold
the entire internet liable simply because of the
86 See Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1554.
87 See id. at 1559.
88 See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1361.
89 Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 23. (citations omitted).
90 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
91 See id. at 1366-73, 1381-82.
92 See id. at 1367-68. Usenet servers maintained the post-
ings from newsgroups for a short period of time-eleven
days for Netcom's system and three days for the BBS. See id.
Once on Netcom's computers, messages were available to
Netcom's customers and Usenet neighbors, who could then
download the messages to their own computers. See id.
93 See id. at 1368.
94 See id. at 1381.
95 See id. at 1372.
96 See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369 (footnote omitted).
97 See id. at 1370.
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way it operates.98 That is, the equipment used to
operate the internet automatically copies user ma-
terial onto its equipment and distributes it to
other users.
Following Netcom, courts continued to view pas-
sive automated functions by ISPs as lacking the
necessary volition required to establish direct lia-
bility.99 The participation standard heavily relies
on "automatic functions" analysis.100 For example,
web site operators generally have not been placed
in the same category as ISPs and BBSs because
they have been found to possess a greater degree
of participation in the content provided on their
sites.101
In two consolidated cases involving Playboy and
several web site operators, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District Court of
Texas held web site operators liable for direct in-
fringement where they developed software that
actively collected infringing material from the in-
ternet and posted it to their web site. 10 2 The web-
site operators argued that they lacked necessary
volition under Netcom to be held liable because
98 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 23 (explaining the po-
tential implications strict liability standards would have for
Usenet servers which, by their function, carry infringing ma-
terial to other servers without human intervention). Con-
ceivably, every single Usenet server in the worldwide link of
computers exchanging materials could be found liable for
copyright infringement. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 at
1369-70.
99 The Netcom volition requirement was adopted in a se-
ries of cases considering the direct liability for copyright in-
fringement claims. See Sega v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that the defendant may have
known of the infringing activity occurring on his BBS, but
since he did not directly cause the copying he could not be
held liable for direct infringement). The finding of against
direct liability in Sega did not preclude the court from find-
ing contributory or vicarious liability. See id. at 932; Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. 503, 512-13
(N.D. Ohio 1997) (holding a BBS operator directly and con-
tributorily liable for copyright infringement where images
from Playboy magazine were knowingly posted for access by
paying subscribers thus meeting the volition requirement).
But see Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Sanfilippo, 97-0670-IEG,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5125, 7-8 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (holding
defendant directly liable for uploading plaintiffs images
onto defendant's hard-drive via File Transfer Protocol ex-
change simply by attacking the Copyright Act's exclusive
grant of authorization power rather than "copy power").
The claim in Sanfilippo was brought under 17 U.S.C. §106,
which gives copyright owners the exclusive right to copy their
works and authorize copies to be made. See id. at 6, 18-20.
The court stated the defendant did not have the authority to
allow the third party to upload the infringing photos. See id.
100 See Shulman, supra note 4, at 556 n.5. Automated
functions are those which the servers are programmed to
complete without human intervention. See id.
their software automatically searched and posted
material, as opposed to searching by specific com-
mand. 10 3 The Webbworld court disagreed, con-
trasting the Netcom defendants from Webbworld,
who took "affirmative steps to cause the copies to
be made." 10 4
Direct liability infringement for ISPs may have
been weakened due to the strict evidentiary stan-
dards set under Netcom. But plaintiffs subse-
quently have not hesitated to attempt to apply al-
ternative theories, such as contributory and
vicarious liability.10 5 As discussed above, these al-
ternatives are not specifically enumerated within
the Copyright Act, but instead have evolved from
courts interpreting Section 106 of the Copyright
Act. 10 6 Section 106 grants copyright owners the
exclusive right to authorize others to exploit the
exclusive rights of others. 10 7 The concept of "re-
lated defendants" is derived from this Section,
that is, where one can be held liable for the acts of
others.108 Since the internet enables innumera-
ble direct infringers, both theories make it easier
for the copyright owner to find some party who
101 See Playboy Enterprises v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, 939 F.
Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding web site operator liable
for direct copyright infringement when defendant operator
personally provided the content for the web site).
Chuckleberry is distinguishable from Netcom because the de-
fendant provided more than simple access to the world wide
web. See also Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip.
Distributors, 983 F.Supp. 1167 (N.D. I1. 1997) (denying web
site operator cross motion for summary judgment and find-
ing possible contributory infringement of copyright where
his agent copied protected "clip art" onto defendant's web
site available for users to download onto their own com-
puters). While the ISP hosting the web page was not found
directly liable because it did not engage in the infringing ac-
tivity, the court in Marobie indicated the ISP could be found
liable for contributory infringement depending on the ex-
tent of knowledge it had. See id. See also Electronic Information
Policy & Law Report, Vol. 2, No. 47 1088-1565 at 1275 (Dec.
12, 1997).
102 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F.
Supp. 1171 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997) [herein-
after Webbworld I], aff d Playboy Enterprises v. Webbworld,
168 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Webbworld II]. See
also Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 25.
103 See Webbworld I, 991 F. Supp. at 549-50.
104 Id. at 552.
105 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 15. Courts have strug-
gled to tailor statutory intent and existing case law to the in-
ternet and computer technology. Id. at 19.
106 See Leaffer, supra note 27, at §9.20 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, 94TH CONG., 2ND SESS. 159 (1976). See also 17
U.S.C. §106.
107 See id.
108 See id.
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can be held liable.' 0 9 In fact, every court to date
considering cyberspace copyright infringement
claims has held vicarious and contributory liability
theories as acceptable for the jury to consider.11
Netcom and Webbworld paved the way for contrib-
utory liability claims where only knowledge and
participation"' 1 in the infringing acts exist (as op-
posed to the actual "act" of copying necessary for
direct liability). 112 However, exactly what level of
knowledge is satisfactory to successfully prove con-
tributory infringement remains open for interpre-
tation. In Netcom, both the ISP and BBS operator
were notified by plaintiff of the infringing mate-
rial posted.' II No question arose as to whether
either had knowledge of the activity.' 14 Notably,
one court suggested that the sole operation of a
BBS could serve as constructive knowledge to de-
fendant BBSs that infringing activity has oc-
curred-enough so to impose liability.' 15
Following Netcom, a potentially troublesome ex-
pansion of the participation requirement for con-
tributory infringement liability was decided in Fo-
novisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc.'1 6 In Fonovisa, the
Ninth Circuit held that the participation in in-
fringing activity need not be "substantial." 11 7
Swap meet operators were held contributorily lia-
ble for the acts of individual vendors who were
selling copyrighted music recordings without per-
109 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 12.
I1 0 See id. at 27.
III Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 (describing the second ele-
ment of a contributory liability claim which requires that the
defendant "induces, causes or materially contributes" to the
infiinging activity).
112 The Netcom court held the standard for "participa-
tion" to be "substantial." Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. How-
ever, following that decision, the Ninth Circuit in Fonovisa de-
creased the level of participation necessary for contributory
infringement liability to less than substantial. 76 F.3d at 264.
In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that providing site and
facilities known by consumers to be a location for "infringing
activity is sufficient to establish contributory liability." See id.
See also Marobie-FL, 983 F. Supp. at 1179 (finding issues of ma-
terial fact existed regarding contributory liability claim
against an ISP who stored an infringing web page on its
server); MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. at 932-33 (holding BBS opera-
tor that had undisputed knowledge contributorily liable for
soliciting its subscribers to upload and download copyrighted
video games).
113 See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374.
114 See id. at 1382.
115 See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenbaugh,
Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 514 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (holding de-
fendant BBS liable for contributory infringement, the court
stated: "Defendants had at least constructive knowledge that
infringing activity was likely to be occurring on their BBS [be-
cause they encouraged subscribers to upload information in-
mission." ' Since there was no question the oper-
ators had knowledge of the infringing activity, the
court was left to determine whether the opera-
tors' participation level was enough to warrant
contributory infringement. 1 9 According to the
court, providing the site and facilities where the
provider actually knew infringing activity was oc-
curring constituted ample participation to create
contributory liability. 120 While this case did not
involve online service providers, its effects will un-
doubtedly affect future courts analyses of contrib-
utory liability.
The success of contributory infringement liabil-
ity has essentially eliminated the need for vicari-
ous infringement liability online. 121 However, vi-
carious liability should not be discounted as a
possible liability theory for service providers. Pre-
dicting what will satisfy the required control and
direct financial benefit elements necessary to sup-
port a vicarious liability infringement claim in the
online environment became a lot more difficult
thanks to Fonovisa. In addition to lowering the
participation standard for contributory liability,
the Fonovisa court's interpretation of "direct fi-
nancial" benefit also lessened the threshold for
what could be considered sufficient to make a vi-
carious liability claim.' 22 In the online context,
charging a fee for downloading infringing materi-
cluding adult files].... Playboy magazine is one of the most
famous and widely distributed adult publications in the
world. It seems disingenuous for defendants to assert that
they were unaware that copies of photographs from Playboy
magazine were likely to find their way onto the BBS."). See
also Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 30. Copyright notices on
posted or to-be-posted works have been found to be one such
form of knowledge since most copyrighted works on the In-
ternet already have notices. See id. An issue, raised by such a
standard that has not been fully examined by the courts is
the removal of copyright notices by parties posting the in-
fringing material. See id.
116 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 259.
117 See id.
118 See id. at 261.
119 See id. at 264.
120 See id. Byproviding an environment and market for
illegal copies of recordings to "thrive," the swap meet opera-
tors participation could not be considered "passive." Id.
121 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 32.
122 See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d. at 263. The swap meet promot-
ers were found to directly benefit from the infringing activity
because they leased the areas where infringing activity oc-
curred, sold tickets to enter the activity and operated conces-
sion stands that also generated a profit. See id. This was con-
sidered adequate promotion and control leading to a
financial benefit. See id. at 263-64. "In this case, the sale of
pirated recordings at the Cherry Auction swap meet is a
'draw' for customers .... " Id.
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als is obviously a financial benefit.123 However, it
remains uncertain when a service provider re-
ceives a "direct" financial benefit from activities
occurring on its systems as opposed to a tangen-
tial benefit. Theories alleging that infringing ac-
tivity enhances the value of an ISP's service, thus
attracting more subscribers, have been dismissed
by the courts. 124 It has yet to be determined
whether increased advertising revenues as a result
of increased "traffic" to a particular internet site
constitute a direct financial benefit.1 25
Fonovisa's impact extends to the right and abil-
ity to control element of vicarious liability. While
courts have failed to define "ability" to control
with respect to online service providers, it has
been held that the relevant issue is not whether
service providers exercise control over individuals
uploading and downloading infringing material,
but whether they had the right and ability to con-
trol what happens on their websites. 126
III. COPYRIGHT LIABILITY LIMITATIONS
FOR ISPS CONTAINED IN THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Legislative History
The Online Copyright Infringement Liability
123 See Webbworld, 968 F. Supp. at 1171; Webbworld 1, 991 F.
Supp. at 560 (selling adult pictures was the sole purpose of
the website).
124 See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1377. See also Marobie-FL,
983 F. Supp. at 1167.
125 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 36.
126 See Webbworld, 968 F. Supp. at 1177.
127 Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 201-03, 112 Stat. 2861 (1998)
(to be codified at 17 U.S.C. §512).
128 See House Delay in Passage of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act H.R. 2281, 144 CONG. REc. S12730, (Oct. 20,
1998).
The 1998 report of the International Intellectual Prop-
erty Alliance confirms the importance of copyright
based industries to our American economy and our eco-
nomic future. The report demonstrates for the seventh
straight year that the U.S. copyright industries continue
to be one of the largest and fastest growing segments of
the U.S. economy. These industries are leading the
country into the digital age and the 21st century.
Id.
129 See Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 513-14 (finding BBS
operator directly and contributorily liable for copyright in-
fringement where images from Playboy magazine were know-
ingly posted for access by paying subscribers); Marobie-FL,
983 F. Supp. at 1179. (denying defendants motion for sum-
maryjudgment on contributory infringement of "clip art" by
ISP and web site operator. since factual determination re-
garding service providers' knowledge about alleged infringe-
ment was necessary). Webbworld, 968 F. Supp. at 1173, 1177
Act was enacted by Congress as Title II of
DMCA.12 7 The new legislation, amending the
Copyright Act of 1976, set out to codify technolog-
ically-sound guidelines for liability based on the
new medium for publishing and distributing in-
formation. 128 Title II limits liability for providers
of "network access" and "online services" and sub-
stantially alters prior case law holding service
providers liable for copyright infringement. 29
Notably, Title II differed substantially from the
recommendation of a Presidential National Intel-
lectual Property Information Task Force ("IITF")
formed in February 1993 to "articulate and imple-
ment the Administration's vision for the National
Information Infrastructure."'' 30  In September
1995, the group's final report, "The White Pa-
per," 31 stated that "altering the standards of lia-
bility for infringement would be a significant de-
parture from current copyright principles and law
and would result in a substantial derogation of
(issuing summary judgment for copyright infringement
against web site operator uploading "adult images" including
copyrighted photographs from Playboy). See also Sega En-
ters. v. Sabella, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20470 1,6, 19-20, 25
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding BBS operator liable for contribu-
tory, not direct, copyright infringement by maintaining
server file that she had knowledge was used by her subscrib-
ers to upload and download unauthorized copies of Sega
games); MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. at 933 (holding BBS operator
contributorily liable for customers' uploading of Sega video
game software to sell or trade for copies of other games);
Netcom, 907 F.'Supp. at 1368, 1373 (stating that while ISP and
BBS operators cannot be held directly liable for infringe-
ment. for posting copyrighted material due to lack of "voli-
tion," they may be vicariously or contributorily liable); Frena,
839 F. Supp. 1559 (holding that uploading Playboy images
without permission creates contributory liability for copyright
infringement for operator where subscribers actually
uploaded the material).
130 White Paper, supra note 31, at 1. Chaired by the late
Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown, the IITF was com-
prised of Federal agency representatives. See id. Stated goals
of the group were "to develop comprehensive telecommuni-
cations and information policies and programs that will pro-
mote the development of the NII and best meet the country's
needs." Id.
131 See id. at 2. The authors of the White Paper analyzed
most areas of intellectual property law with an emphasis on
copyright law. See id. The NIl is described in the White Paper
as "encompassing digital, interactive services now available,
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the rights of copyright owners." 132 In short, the
Clinton administration strongly supported strict
liability for ISPs who transmit infringing material
through their computers in any way.1 33 But the
White Paper generated more controversy than
support, and sparked quite a reaction from courts
who disagreed with it and a legislature which ig-
nored it.134
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which was
the result of a compromise between copyright
owners and online industry representatives, ad-
ded a new Section 512 to the Copyright Act of
1976.135 The provisions enacted were specifically
intended to codify the Netcom decision (and thus
overrule Frena) by, inter alia, requiring volition on
the part of ISPs for a finding of direct infringe-
ment.1 36 The law has received mixed reviews from
industry representatives-it's been called "a
Washington approach to a simple kind of prob-
lem" because of its broad language and compli-
cated requirements.1 37
B. Title II's Purpose: Limited Copyright
Liability for ISPs
The statute seeks to limit copyright liability for
those who qualify as service providers.1 38 While
such as the internet, as well as those contemplated for the
future." Id. Input was received from electronic industries,
service providers, academic, research, library and legal users,
as well as the computer software, motion picture, music,
broadcasting, publishing and other information and en-
tertainment industries. See id. at 5.
132 Id.
133 See id.
134 See Skelton, supra note 32, at 265-68 (discussing vari-
ous reactions to the White Paper).
135 See 17 U.S.C. §512.
136 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 50.
137 SeeJohn Borland, Law Enlists ISPs in Piracy Fight, (vis-
ited Nov. 9, 1998) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/
0,4,28357,00.html> (quoting Dave McClure, executive direc-
tor of the Association of Online Professionals, a trade group
that represents ISPs as stating "This isn't what we would have
wanted. It's a Washington approach to a simple kind of
problem").
138 See id.
139 See Skelton, supra note 32, at 246.
140 See id. at 247.
141 See id. at 246.
142 See Bruce G.Joseph, member, Wiley, Rein & Fielding,
memorandum, "Summary of the Online Copyright Infringe-
ment Act," at 4, 1998 [hereinafter Joseph]. Mr.Joseph was a
principal negotiator representing service provider interests
during the Senate negotiations that finally resulted in Title II
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Id.
143 See 17 U.S.C. §504.
Title II benefits could protect service providers'
purses by guarding against mammoth monetary
penalties associated with copyright infringements,
a number of hurdles must be overcome before
the protections take effect.13 9 The first hurdle is
determining who the service providers are. 140
What would seem to be a bright-line test is actu-
ally unclear because tracing information transfers
back to individuals or service providers is not al-
ways easy or possible.' 4 ' The second hurdle is de-
fining and compartmentalizing each function of
the ISP. As noted above, liability limitations hinge
on both service provider status and the perform-
ance of a certain function.
C. The Stakes
The provisions calling for injunctive relief as
opposed to monetary damages were a major vic-
tory for online service providers in the creation of
Title 11.142 Copyright cases have the possibility of
yielding enormous cash awards to copyright own-
ers whose rights have been infringed. 1 43  ISPs
under Title II that are prima facie guilty for either
direct, contributory or vicarious infringement are
not liable for such monetary damages.' 44
Without the protection provided by Title II, as
A copyright owner may choose to recover either: (a) the
copyright owner's actual damages plus any additional
profits of the infringer; or (b) statutory damages ("in a
sum not less than $500 or more than $20,000" for each
act of infringement. . . "The court may in its discretion
increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not
more than $100,000 [per each infringing act] where the
act is "willful"). 17 U.S.C.§504(c)(1)-(2). Due to the na-
ture of the internet, actual damages to a copyright
owner would be indeterminable because there is no way
to calculate exactly how many copies were made and dis-
tributed. The statutory damage provision therefore be-
comes extremely important to the recovery of damages
in cyberspace.
144 See 17 U.S.C. §512. See also Lilli Hsieh et. al., Intellec-
tualProperty Crimes, 35 Am. CRiM. L. REv. 899, 918 (1998) (dis-
cussing traditional copyright defenses including "fair use,"
"parody," "scenes a faire," and "first sale"). In the event that a
service provider does not qualify for the limitation on liabil-
ity, it still may claim all of the defenses available to it under
current law. SeeJoseph, supra note 131, at 2. The Act does
not create any new liabilities. See id. In other words, the act
does not determine whether a service provider is or is not an
infringer. See id. If its conduct falls within the scope of func-
tions protected, it is protected. See id. Even if an ISP's activ-
ity falls outside the limitations on liability specified in the bill,
the ISP is not necessarily an infringer. See id. Liability under
these circumstances would be adjudicated based on direct,
vicarious or contributory liability as articulated in the Copy-
right Act and case law unchanged by §512. See id.
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the internet grows, large online service providers
with deep pockets would become increasingly sus-
ceptible to considerable financial distress if forced
to defend 'against copyright infringement
claims. 145 For example, a California District
Court awarded nearly $4 million to a copyright
owner whose pictures were unlawfully copied
onto defendant web site operator's site. 146 While
this case applied a relatively straightforward copy-
right infringement analysis because it clearly in-
volved the active participation of the web site op-
erator in uploading the images, it does serve as a
good example of potentially high damage
awards. ' 47
The protected functions of a service provider
listed in Title II are qualified with an exemption
from monetary liability even if under prior case
law infringements could be found.' 48 This limita-
tion is the heart of Title II. It does not change
existing definitions and requirements for copy-
right infringement, but rather accommodates a
new technology and protects parties that, in real-
ity, are not truly responsible for the infringe-
ments.14
9
145 But see, Mark C. Morril & Sarah E. Eaton, Protecting
Copyrights On-Line: Copyr ght Liability for Online Service Providers,
8 No. 4J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 2, 3 (Apr. 1996) (discussing "in-
nocent copyright infringer doctrine" which limits fine to
$200 for infringers who were not aware or had no reason to
believe-their actions constituted copyright infringements).
146 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 5 n.21 (citing
Sanfilippo, 97-0670-IEG, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5125).
147 See Skelton, supra note 32, at 307. "Recently, an ac-
cess-only provider in Northern Virginia was sued by a copy-
right owner under a theory of copyright infringement.
Although the service provider settled before trial, just a few
months of litigation preparation represented a large chunk
of its annual revenue. This is a burden that most providers
are unable to undertake, particularly if they can do nothing
to minimize their liability." Id.
148 See 17 U.S.C. §512(a)-(d). "A service provider shall
not be liable for monetary relief or, except as provided in
subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for in-
fringement of copyright by reason of the provider's... [trans-
mitting/routing, caching, third-party postings, or informa-
tion location tools]." Id. Section (g), the notice and
takedown provision, is also considered a protected function.
See 17 U.S.C. §512(g). However, it does not mention a spe-
cific exemption from monetary liability. In (g) (4), it states
that a service provider shall not be liable for copyright in-
fringement if it complies with the "notice and take-down" re-
quirements outlined. Therefore, if a copyright owner's claim
for copyright infringement is later found to be valid, a service
provider may not be held liable for complying with this sec-
tion of the Act which requires the service provider to control
content. This is the only portion of the Act that permits ser-
vice providers to control content and escape liability. See 17
U.S.C. §512 (g).
Injunctive relief, however, is available. 150 When
a successful infringement claim is brought, courts
may grant relief by ordering the suspension or ter-
mination of access to an infringing subscriber,
blocking access to a particular site, or taking ac-
tion "necessary" to stop copyright infringe-
ment.' 51 When considering which type of injunc-
tive relief to order, the court is bound to weigh
the financial burden of the service provider
against the harm suffered by the copyright owner
if no action is taken to remove the infringing ma-
terial. 152
D. Ambiguous Service Provider Definitions
There are. two definitions for service provider in
Title II.15 3 The first definition, transmitting on-
line communications, is relatively straightforward
in its meaning and applies to "conduit" activity.' 54
That is, a service that provides plain old access to
the internet-no bells, whistles, or content.155
The second definition is much broader and ap-
pears to be a catchall, applying to "providers of
online services or network access." 156 The second
149 See 17 U.S.C. §512 0) (stating that "[t]he following
rules shall apply in the case of any application for an injunc-
tion under section 502 against a service provider that is not
subject to monetary remedies under this section .....
150 See id.
151 See 17 U.S.C. §512 0)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
152 , See 17 U.S.C. §512 (j)(2)(A)-(D).
The court... shall consider (A) whether such an injunc-
tion, either alone or in combination with other such in-
junctions issued against the same service provider under
this subsection, would significantly burden either the
provider or the operation of the provider's system or
network; (B) the magnitude of the harm likely to be suf-
fered by the copyright owner in the digital network envi-
ronment if steps are not taken to prevent or restrain the
infringement; (C) whether implementation .... [is]
technically feasible and would not interfere with access
to noninfringing material at other online locations; and
(D) whether other less burdensome and comparably ef-
fective means of preventing or restraining access to the
infringing material are available.
Id.
153 17 U.S.C. §512 (k) (1) (A)-(B).
154 See 17 U.S.C. §512 (k)(1)(A). "As used in subsection
(a), the term 'service provider' means an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital
online communications, between or among points specified
by a user of material as sent or received." Id.
155 See id.
156 17 U.S.C. §512(k)(1)(B). "As used in this subsection,
other than subsection (a), the term 'service provider' means
a provider of online services or network access, or the opera-
tor of facilities therefor, and includes an entity described in
subparagraph (A)." Id.
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definition poses the most significant questions
and, unfortunately, the statute does little to pro-
vide answers. 157 The section-by-section analysis
provided by the House Judiciary Committee spe-
cifically included "services such as providing in-
ternet access, e-mail, chat room and web page
hosting services."1 58 In addition to traditional on-
line service providers, this definition appears to
include any business that may operate a web site
or other internet services or facilities, including
private networks "intranets.' 1 59
Most businesses operating web sites or network-
ing their employees' computers likely would not
consider themselves "service providers" that are
vulnerable to any sort of copyright liability. The
law, however, does not define what a "provider of
online services" is, nor does it define "network ac-
cess."1 60 The linchpin to ISP status appears to be
the facilitation of access to the internet and its var-
ious resources. That is, anyone providing any sort
of online service or network access could be con-
sidered an ISP, but the issue relating to its func-
tion still exists for those desiring Title II protec-
tion.
For example, large ISPs not only provide access
to the internet, but in some cases they also pro-
vide content such as encyclopedia-like
157 Committee On The Judiciary, 105th Cong., Section
By Section Analysis Of H.R. 2281 As Passed By The United
States House of Representatives On August 4, 1998, 39
(1998) [hereinafter Analysis]. Although slightly more spe-
cific than the statutory language in §512 (k) (1) (B) (the sec-
ond definition of service provider), neither the statute nor
the analysis concretely defines the elements that comprise
any of these services.
158 Id.
159 See Coie, supra note 13 at 1. "Intranet" is defined as
"a private network inside a company or organization that
uses the same kinds of software that you would find on the
public internet, but that is for internal use. As the internet
has become more popular, many of the tools used on the
internet are being used in private networks, for example,
many companies have web servers that are available only to
employees." Internet Glossary, supra note 67.
160 See 17 U.S.C. §512(k).
161 See Shulman, supra note 4, at 555.
162 See 17 U.S.C. §512 (i) (1) (A)-(B). See also 17 U.S.C.
§512(i) (2) (A)-(C).
The limitations on liability established by Section 512
(i) (1)(A)-(B) shall apply to a service provider only if the
service provider (A) has adopted and reasonably imple-
mented, and informs subscribers and account holders of
the service provider's system or network of, a policy that
provides for the termination in appropriate circum-
stances of subscribers and account holders of the service
provider's system or network who are repeat infringers;
and (B) accommodates and does not interfere with stan-
databases.1 6 1 Clearly, they are not exempt from
copyright infringement liability when the material
they post is infringing. However, a question exists
as to whether they can still be found liable for ma-
terial posted by users in an area where they do not
provide content, but provide guided access.
E. Liability Limitation Compliance
Requirements
Service providers are required to comply with
certain criteria (such as appointing an agent to
handle copyright owner complaints and filing the
information with the U.S. Copyright Office) de-
pending on their function.1 62 Section 512 pro-
vides limited liability for the four functions dis-
cussed below.163
1. Transitory Digital Network Communications
As long as several criteria are satisfied, the lia-
bility exemption provided by Section 512 shields
service providers from third party infringing ma-
terial that merely passes through its system.1 64 It
codifies the Netcom decision and replaces the
Frena court's strict liability standards for service
providers acting in their capacity as "conduits." 165
dard technical measures. "Standard Technical meas-
ures" is defined as "technical measures that are used by
copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted
works and: (A) have been developed pursuant to a
broad consensus of copyright owners and service provid-
ers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards
process; (B) are available to any person on reasonable
and nondiscriminatory terms; and (C) do not impose
substantial costs on service providers or substantial bur-
dens on their systems or networks.
163 See 17 U.S.C. §512(a)-(d). The limited liability only
attaches if service providers perform one of the listed func-
tions. See Coie, supra note 13, at 127. Generally, however, the
functions to which liability limitations apply are passive activi-
ties where the service provider fails to exercise any control
over, or interact with, the content of the infringing material.
See id.
164 See 17 U.S.C. §512(a). "[T]ransmitting, routing, or
providing connections for, material through a system or net-
work controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or
by reason of the intermediate and transient storage of that
material in the course of such transmitting, routing, or pro-
viding connections .... Id.
165 The elements of each function differ, and they are
evaluated individually for determining whether the particular
action of a service provider is protected or not. See id. In
other words, a service provider's activities may qualify for pro-
tection under one category, but not the other. See id. If an
activity does not fall under one of the liability limitation activ-
ities, then the service provider will be evaluated under tradi-
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Specifically, eligibility requires that service provid-
ers not alter content, initiate the transmission,
make or keep copies for longer than the time it
takes to transmit or route, or select recipients for
the transmission.' 66 The conduit protection is in-
tended to extend to activities such as: (1) sending
and receiving e-mail; (2) web site information re-
trieval; (3) posting material by users to and from
chat rooms and bulletin boards; and (4) provid-
ing internet access in general.1 67
2. System Caching168
Service providers may, subject to several condi-
tions, store material on their servers from outside
web sites in order to provide quick and easy access
by their users.169 Conditions for the system cach-
ing liability qualification include the service pro-
vider's transmission of materials to a third party
without modification and compliance with gener-
ally accepted industry standard data communica-
tions protocols that concern refreshing, reloading
or updating cached material.1 7 0  Additionally,
with certain exceptions, the service provider may
not interfere with the technology used by the
originating person to return information back to
tional copyright liability standards. See id.
166 See 17 U.S.C. §512(a)(1)-(5). Service providers meet-
ing the "conduit" definition must meet all five stipulations
before qualifying for the limited liability. See id. The statute
protects them if:
(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at
the direction of a person other than the service pro-
vider; (2) the transmission, routing, provision of connec-
tions, or storage is carried out through an automatic
technical process without selection of the material by the
service provider; (3) the service provider does not select
the recipients of the material except an automatic re-
sponse to the request of another person; (4) no copy of
the material made by the service provider in the course
of such intermediate or transient storage is maintained
on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessi-
ble to anyone other than anticipated recipients, and no
such copy is maintained on the system or network in a
manner ordinarily accessible to such anticipated recipi-
ents for a longer period than is reasonably necessary for
the transmission, routing, or provision of connections;
and (5) 'the material is transmitted through the system
or network without modification of its content.
Id.
167 See Joseph, supra note 142, at 4.
168 Caching is defined as "a different form of intermedi-
ate and temporary storage .... used to increase network per-
formance and to reduce network congestion generally, as
well as to reduce congestion and delays to popular sites. This
storage is intermediate .... between the originating site and
ultimate user. The material in question is stored on the ser-
vice provider's system or network for some period of time to
that person. 171 Service providers must also sub-
ject their users to the same visitation conditions
(e.g., fees and passwords) for cached material as
the originating site. 172 Finally, if the material was
made available without permission from the copy-
right owner, the service provider must remove the
material upon notice as long as the material has
also been removed from the originating site. 173
3. Information Residing On Systems or Networks at
the Direction of Users
Of the four protections for service providers,
the umbrella provided to service providers for in-
fringing material posted by third parties is proba-
bly the most wide-reaching in terms of the func-
tions it seems likely to protect. Arguably, the most
elaborate requirements service providers must ad-
here to in Title II are also contained in this sec-
tion: designating an agent to receive notifications
of infringement claims, notice and takedown pro-
visions. 174 In other words, any entity defined as a
service provider is required to appoint a person to
receive complaints regarding alleged infringing
material and register with the U.S. Copyright Of-
fice. 175 If no agent exists, there is no limited lia-
facilitate access by users subsequent to the one who previ-
ously sought access to it." ANALYsis, supra note 157 at 27.
169 17 U.S.C. §512(b) (1) (A)-(C). The statute defines cir-
cumstances under which caching is protected as the interme-
diate and temporary storage of material on a system or net-
work controlled or operated by or for the service provider in
a case in which the material is made available online by a
person other than the service provider. See id. Second, the
person (not the service provider) transmitting the material
via the service provider's system or network must be sending
it to someone other than himself. See id. Finally, an auto-
matic technical process must be operating to store the mate-
rial for the purpose of making the material available to users
of the system or network. See id.
170 See 17 U.S.C. §512(b)(2)(B).
171 See 17 U.S.C. §512 (b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii) (outlining the
exceptions which basically exclude unreasonable technologi-
cal protections that would interfere with normal ISP func-
tions).
172 See 17 U.S.C. §512 (b)(2)(D).
173 See 17 U.S.C. §512 (b)(2)(E).
174 See 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(2). To receive liability limita-
tions, service providers must do two things. See id. First, they
must designate an agent to receive notification of claimed
infringements and provide the public with contact informa-
tion on the agent (proper notification guidelines are located
in §512(c)(3)). See id. Second, service providers must regis-
ter the name, address, phone number and e-mail address of
the agent with the Copyright Office, as well as any other con-
tact information which the Register finds necessary. See id.
175 What constitutes proper notification is clearly stated
in §512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(vi). The notice must be (1) a written
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bility protection. 76
When a third party stores infringing material
on a service provider's system or network, 1 77 the
service provider is not liable for monetary dam-
ages if it does not have actual knowledge that the
material is infringing;178 it does not receive a fi-
nancial benefit directly attributable to the infring-
ing activity; 179 and upon receiving notice of the
infringing activity, responds "expeditiously" to re-
move or disable access to the material claimed to
be infringing.'80
The knowledge element of this section is im-
portant to highlight. The second part of the test
providing for "apparent" notice was a central ele-
ment to the legislative compromise reached be-
tween the online service industry and copyright
owner representatives.' 8 ' Since the determina-
tion of a service provider's knowledge could also
make the difference between a finding of contrib-
utory and vicarious liability, it is critical to create a
standard to which a service provider can reason-
ably be held. 18 2
Title II's section dealing with information resid-
ing on systems or networks specifically states that
a service provider has no duty to monitor its ser-
vice or seek out infringing material. 1 83 Presuma-
bly, since there is no affirmative obligation to in-
vestigate the material, a service provider will thus
communication with a physical or electronic signature of
either the owner or a person authorized to act on behalf of
the owner of an exclusive right that has allegedly been in-
fringed, as well as contact information of the complaining
party; (2) a clear description of the alleged copyrighted
works and a description of their alleged infringing location;
(3) a statement that the complaining party has a good faith
belief that use of the material in the manner complained of
is not authorized by the copyright owner; and (4) a statement
that the information in the notification is authorized and ac-
curate, under penalty of perjury. See 17 U.S.C.
§512(c) (3) (A) (i)-(vi) (1998).
176 See id.
177 See 17 U.S.C. §512(c)
178 See 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). The actual
knowledge stipulation includes "apparent knowledge." Id.
Apparent knowledge occurs when a service provider is not
aware of facts or circumstances from which the infringing ac-
tivity is clear, such as uploaded files using a large amount of
hard drive memory, or URLs containing words like "pirate"
or "copy." See ANALYsis, supra note 157, at 32.
179 See 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(B).
180 See 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(C).
181 SeeJoseph, supra note 142, at 5. "The awareness of
facts and circumstances is a subjective standard. The plaintiff
must prove that the service provider had actual, subjective
awareness of the facts and circumstances on which plaintiff
relies. However, the question of whether infringement is
.apparent" is an objective standard evaluated on the basis of
not lose the liability protection if it becomes
aware of material that may be "suspect," but not
"obvious" or "apparent."1 84
The Congressional Analysis suggests a "red flag"
test exists within the language of the statute it-
self.'1 5 No ISP is required to monitor its service
or affirmatively seek facts indicating infringing ac-
tivity. 186 However, the liability limitation will be
lost if the ISP becomes aware of a "red flag" that
suggests infringing activity and it takes no action
to remove or stop the infringements. a8 7
The section-by-section analysis provided by the
House of Representatives also addressed the
meaning of "financial benefit" in relation to this
portion of Title III8 suggesting a "common sense,
fact-based approach, not a formalistic one."1 89 , It
distinguished receiving a one-time set-up fee and
flat periodic payment from a "financial benefit di-
rectly attributable to the infringing activity."'190
Any financial gain that is received from providing
the access to the infringements is considered part
of that meaning.'9 '
4. Linking to Infringing Material Via Information
Location Tools' 92
Section 512(d) exempts service providers who
provide "short cuts" to other internet locations
a reasonable person. The legislative history uses the words
'obvious' and 'clearly' as synonyms of 'apparent' to describe
infringement." Id.
182 See 17 U.S.C. §512(m).
183 See 17 U.S.C. §512(m) (emphasis added).
184 See 17 U.S.C. §512(m).
185 See ANALYSIs, supra note 157, at 29. Determining
whether the facts or circumstances constitute a "red flag"
would be based on an objective "reasonable person" stan-
dard. See id. That is, would the infringing activity have been
apparent to a reasonable person operating the same or simi-
lar circumstances. See id. Determining whether the service
provider was actually aware of the "red flag" would be subjec-
tively evaluated based on individual facts and circumstances.
See id.
186 See id. at 29.
187 See id Action to be taken requires the expeditious
removal of infringing material or the disabling of access to
that material. See id. Due to factual circumstances and tech-
nological limitations varying from case to case, it is impossi-
ble to identify a uniform time limit for expeditious action.
See id.
188 See id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 See id.
192 An "information location tool" is a directory or index
of online sites or material such as a search engine that identi-
fies pages by specified criteria, a reference to other online
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that may contain infringing material on their sites
from monetary liability.1 93 To qualify for the lia-
bility limitation, upon notification, service provid-
ers are required to remove infringing material as
described in the other functions.194 They also
must not have knowledge of the infringing activity
on the other sites and they must not receive a di-
rect financial benefit from linking to the infring-
ing sites.195
:, Commentators have raised concerns regarding
what constitutes knowledge of an infringing
site.1 96 They argue that the statute is unclear as to
whether online directories prepared by human
editors and reviewers who view and classify various
internet sites would be denied the safe harbor if
they view the infringing site.1 97 The knowledge
provision is the same as that is found in Section
512(c) (information residing on a system or net-
work).198 An ISP has no obligation to seek out
copyright infringement, but it would not qualify
for the liability limitation if it ignored "red flags"
of blatant infringement. 99
Another "red flag" test has been suggested as
the criteria for judging whether knowledge is
present.200 For example, site or file Titles con-
taining words that indicate illegality, such as "pi-
rate.com," "bootleg.com" or other slang terms for
intellectual property theft in their uniform re-
source locator ("URL") and header information
may be considered enough of a notice, or a "red
flag," to render knowledge present.20 1
The copyright owner could also attempt to
prove the location was "clearly, at the time the di-
material such as a list of recommended sites, a pointer that
stands for an Internet location or address, or a hypertext link
which allows users to access material without entering its ad-
dress. See ANALysis, supra note 157, at 32.
193 17 U.S.C. §512(d).
194 See 17 U.S.C. §512(c) (3), discussed supra note 175.
195 17 U.S.C. §512(d)(2).
196 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 43.
197 See ANALysis, supra note 157, at 32.
198 See 17 U.S.C. §512(c) (3), discussed supra note 175.
199 See ANALysIs, supra note 157, at 33.
200 See id. at 32.
201 See id.
202 See id. at 33.
203 Id.
204 Michael Robertson, Top Ten Things Everyone Should
Know About MP3, (visited Feb. 5, 1999) <http:www.mp3.com/
new/070.html>.
205 MP3 is simply a format used to store files. Michael
Robertson, MP3 for Beginners (visited Feb. 5, 1999) <http://
www.mp3.com/faq/general.html>. It can be used legally or
illegally. See id. Using an MP3 is legal if the song's copyright
rectory provider viewed it, a "pirate" site where
unauthorized materials are available for
download. 20 2 The Section-by-Section Analysis of Title
II, as provided by the House of Representatives,
says the red flag test "strikes the right balance" be-
cause the "apparent" knowledge required would
catch illegitimate service providers preparing in-
fringing sites.203 However, recent technological
developments have created circumstances where
apparent knowledge could seemingly be found
without such blatant triggers, e.g. a trade organi-
zation's warning to a company that their activity is
illegal.
IV. INTRODUCING MP3: A COPYRIGHT
PIRATE'S RECIPE FOR INFRINGEMENT
A. How Does MP3 Work?
The development of MP3 technology has drawn
increased attention to the capability of online
services to facilitate copyright infringement. MP3
is a standard, not an organization or brand
name. 20 4 Its compression technology, which is
legal, 20 5 has been likened to that of the "Zip" file
format commonly used by PC users which con-
denses files in order to accelerate transfers.20 6
The files are read either on computers by software
available to be downloaded free on the internet
or anywhere by purchasing walkman-like play-
ers. 20 7 Fearing the negative impact these devices
could have on the music industry, the Recording
Industry of America ("RIAA") unsuccessfully sued
holder has granted permission to download and play the
song. See id. It is also used legally to make copies from
purchased CDs for personal use. See id. However, it is illegal
to encode MP3s from CDs and trade them with others with-
out permission from the copyright holder. See id.
206 See id.
207 See Klau, supra note 17, at 17. There are a number of
different ways to "play" MP3 files. See id. For example, Win-
dows 98 which contains "Media Player;" or MusicMatch Juke-
box (http://www.musicmatch.com) shareware can be
downloaded for free with the option to purchase the com-
plete version. See id. The software has the capability to covert
songs from C.D.s to MP3 format where they may be stored on
a hard drive. See id. It is also possible to transfer them to a
writeable C.D. and play them back on any MP3-enabled CD
players. See id. Diamond Multi-media Services produced one
of the first hand-held portable devices onto which MP3 files
may be transferred and replayed. See id. The "Rio" is a 32-
megabyte hard-drive which runs on a single double AA bat-
tery available for $199. Id. See also <http://www.diamondmm.
com/products/current/rio.ctm>.
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the manufacturers of the portable players, which
are not designed to "copy protect" audio files to
prevent the illegal sale of copyrighted material. 20 8
While the music industry currently has the capa-
bility to include advanced technology in music
files to prevent its illegal use, most copyrighted
songs presently available are not safeguarded. 20 9
More than 600 Internet Relay Chat ("IRC")
channels and hundreds of web sites provide files
furnishing free music in the compressed for-
mat.210 While record companies actively shut
down many illegal MP3 sites, IRC systems make it
nearly impossible to control illegal use of MP3
files. 211 "The top IRC system, Efnet, can handle
40,000 to 50,000 simultaneous online users; ICQ
can have 500,000. AOL can have a million."212
Additionally, many MP3 users send files from fake
or hacked internet addresses that are usually im-
possible to trace back to the sender.213
B. Providing Links to Infringing Material:
Enter Lycos, Inc.
Internet company Lycos, Inc. launched a search
engine,214 Fast MP3 Search, which reportedly
posted over a half million links to MP3 song files
208 See Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v.
Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 624
(1998). The RIAA was denied a preliminary injunction to
prevent the release of the "Rio" after a district court ruled
the device did not violate the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992 ("AHRA") (17 U.S.C. §§1001). Id. at 27. The Act im-
plemented the "Serial Copy Management System" ("SCMS")
around the time of the first digital audio tape players and was
intended to impede consumers ability to hurt the record in-
dustry by making unauthorized copies by allowing copyright
holders to encode copy protection in their original record-
ings, which recording devices were required to recognize. See
Klau, supra note 17, at 18. The court determined that be-
cause the Rio is not capable of "serially copying" digital works
it did not fall within the purview of the AHRA. See id. See also
Margaret Quan &Yoshiko Hara, Sony, Toshiba and Others Pro-
pose Security Technologies and Prep Products-Music Group Gets
First Take on Web Standard, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES,
Mar. 1, 1999. Analysts estimate 12 portable digital audio
players will be on the market by the end of 1999 with one to
two million units expected to be sold by Christmas. See id.
Several other MP3 players are currently being planned for
release, including car players and hybrid stereo components.
See id. For a general discussion of upcoming technology, See
The Next Stage for MP3, WIRED NEWS REPORTS, (visited Mar. 18,
1999) <http://www.wired.com/news/print-ve. . .chnology/
story/i 8547.html?wnpg_l>.
209 See Melissa Ruggieri, Digging New Sounds; MP3 Music is
Gold to Internet Pirates, Chaos to Industry, RICHMOND TIMES Dis-
PATCH, Feb. 25, 1999, at El. Industry-wide safeguards against
copyright infringement are being developed such as digital
watermarking, preventing digital broadcasts from being
on February 1, 1999.215 The computer equip-
ment powering the search engine had to be up-
graded within 48 hours because the demand was
four to five times higher than anticipated. 216
Lycos officials claim the Fast MP3 search engine
avoids copyright infringement problems because
it merely provides lists of sites containing the MP3
files rather than storing the content on their serv-
ers.2 17 While Lycos poses a clever argument, the
question remains whether Lycos can escape liabil-
ity under Title II.
1. Analyzing Lycos' Copyright Liability as a Service
Provider Under Title II
Evaluating whether a service provider is liable
for copyright infringement under Title II requires
two determinations. First, does the ISP satisfy the
technical definition of service provider outlined
in Title II?218 Second, is it engaged in one of the
four protected functions. 21 9
The two types of service providers defined in Ti-
tle II include those strictly acting as conduits to
the internet and those "providers of online serv-
ices or network access, or the operator of facilities
saved and restricting the playback of an audio file to one
computer. See id. Worldwide recording industry leaders
launched the "Secure Digital Music Initiative" (SDMI) in De-
cember 1998 to provide a forum where technology compa-
nies can cooperatively develop digital music security. See
Worldwide Recording Industry and Technology Companies Kick-Off
Work of SDMI, BUSINESS WIRE (Los Angeles), Feb. 26, 1999.
For a general discussion of security methods available see
James Oliver Cury, Remote Contro Get a Download of This: Rec-
ord Labels are Finally Tackling the MP3 Cult With a High-Tech,
High-Security System, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY, Mar. 5, 199,9, at
72. See also Jay Sherman, Net Music Security Forces Huddle, THE
HouLLWOOD REPORTER, Mar. 1, 1999.
210 See Lorek, supra note 19.
211 See Dvorak, supra note 78, at 87.
212 Id.
213 See id.
214 The URL for the Lycos MP3 search engine is <http:/
/www.mp3.lycos.com>. The MP3 search engine allows users
to type the name of a song or artist into a search bar and the
search engine retrieves a list of links where the music may be
downloaded. See Lorek, supra note 19.
215 See Chris Nelson, Lycos' Search Engine: Half Million
Links, Lots of Kinks, SONICET Music NEWS OF THE WOLRD
[hereinafter Nelson] (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.
sonicnet.com/news/articlel.jhtml?index+7>.
216 See id.
217 See Sharon Nash, Tracking Web Music; Industry Trend or
Event, PC MAGAZINE, Mar. 9, 1999, at 29 [hereinafter Nash].
218 See 17 U.S.C. §512(k)(1)(A)-(B).
219 See 17 U.S.C. §512(a)-(d). See also discussion, supra
Section III.
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therefore."220 No definition is provided within Ti-
tle II to clarify the meaning of "provider of online
services or network access." However, the section-
by-section analysis provided by the House Judici-
ary Committee specifically includes services such
as. providing internet access, e-mail, chat room
aid web page hosting services. 221 Presumably, the
second definition was intended to encompass
other services including IRC.222
.,Notwithstanding its status as a service provider,
Lycos and other ISPs providing links to copyright
infringing material can be evaluated under the
described Information Location Tools func-
tion.223
While Title II covers functions related to search
engines in the "Information Location Tools" sec-
tion, the exemption states that: (1) service prov-
iders may not store information; and (2) the in-
formation must be specifically requested by a
user.224 By stopping short of technically storing
the infringing MP3 files on its servers, Lycos ar-
gues it eliminates itself from the portion of Title
II concerning information storage. Instead, Lycos
asserts, it merely provides information to users on
where to find the MP3 files.225 Because Lycos di-
rects a search engine to automatically hunt for all
MP3 songs it can find on the internet, indexes
them and places links to them on its servers for
users to query arguably disqualifies Lycos from
the liability limitation. 226 Lycos is thus searching
for files before users are requesting them.
IThe "information location tools" functional
prohibitions could prove to be the most damag-
ing for Lycos as the restrictions it places on service
provider activity involve knowledge and direct fi-
nancial benefit as prohibited conduct. 227
Although the statute defines the level of knowl-
edge as "actual," it expands this knowledge re-
220 17 U.S.C. §512(k)(1)(B).
221 See ANALYSIS, supra note 157, at 39.
222 Very little guidance is provided by Title II or in the
legislative history suggesting how to define providers of on-
line services or "network access." In fact, the ANALYSIS only
briefly mentions a few examples to differentiate between the
two different service provider definitions. See ANALYSIs, supra
note 157, at 38-39. The ANALYsIs specifically mentions "chat
room" services as included in the second definition. See id. at
39. Chat rooms are operated using IRC. See discussion, supra
Section I.
223 See 1.7 U.S.C. §512(d). See also discussion, supra Sec-
tion III.
224 See 17 U.S.C. §512( c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
225 See Nash, supra note 217, at 29.
226 See id.
quirement to allow that: "in the absence. of such
actual knowledge or awareness, is not aware of
facts or circumstances from which the infringing
activity is apparent."22
Statistics provided by the RIAA could serve as
apparent knowledge that the majority of MP3
songs are illegally posted to the internet. The or-
ganization represents 90 percent of the music in-
dustry.229 It is responsible for the licensing and
sale of materials.230 If the RIAA is not supportive
of MP3 files, the majority song files are most likely
not authorized by them. Additionally, the direct
financial benefit received by Lycos could be con-
strued as increased value of advertising space as a
result of the popularity of the MP3 search files.
A straightforward standard for applying the ele-
ments specifically- to linking services such as the
MP3 search engine is simply not present in Title
II. While the legislative history provides some
assistance in interpreting the extent of internet
services covered by Title II, the statute's actual
language is ambiguous. It remains unclear
whether Lycos qualifies as a service provider or
whether its MP3 search engine qualifies as a pro-
tected function.
2. Recording Industry Claims Majority of MP3 Song
Files Illegal
The RLAA, which represents creators, manufac-
.turers and distributors of more than 90 percent of
all sound recordings, 231 expanded its staff in 1997
to include a team of specialists to monitor the in-
ternet, and additionally implemented an auto-
mated web crawler to scan the internet.2 32
Thousands of internet sites were sent letters in-
forming them that they were infringing on RIAA
company rights. 233 Estimates provided by the
227 See 17 U.S.C. §512(d)(1)(B)-(2).
228 17 U.S.C. §512(d)(1)(B).
229 See discussion, supra n.178 and accompanying text.
230 See id.
231 See Klau, supra note 17, at 18.
232 See RIAA Releases Year-end Anti-piracy Statistics, [herein-
after Antipiracy] (visited Sept. 22, 1998) <http://www.riaa.
com/antipir/releases/apyr97.htm>.
233 See id. 'The majority of the sites were promptly shut
down. See id. In June 1997, however, the RIAA filed civil ac-
tions against three Music Archive Sites for the unauthorized
reproduction and distribution of sound recordings. See id.
In each of these cases, federal courts issued decisions and
consent judgments in the RIAA's favor. See id. Each of the
site operators, as part of the judgments, agreed to refrain
from any further infringements and to destroy any unauthor-
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RIAA indicated there are over 91 million com-
puters in the world connected to the internet to-
day, causing the organization to direct 80% of its
1997 anti-piracy resources to internet investiga-
tions to protect copyrighted sound recordings in
cyberspace. 234
Despite the RIAA's desire to work with MP3
providers to prevent copyright infringement, it
has disapproved of "the format's ease of use and
lack of copy protection [which] encourages piracy
on the internet."235 Although no comprehensive
statistics exist that estimate the number of posted
MP3 files without permission from copyright own-
ers, it is generally conceded that illegal MP3s far
outnumber legal ones.2 36 In fact, many of the
links to the unlicensed songs are removed within
hours of their postings because the bootleggers
do not want to get caught.237
Lycos maintains that the search engine simply
directs users to song files and the company does
not vouch for the legality of the song files posted
at the locations. 238  Yet the company proudly
boasts "if we don't have it, nobody does" and pro-
vides detailed instructions on how to 'join the
revolution. '" 2 39 Focusing on case law preceding
Title II and the language of Title II itself, Lycos is
clearly testing the limits of online copyright in-
fringement.
3. Evaluating Lycos' MP3 Search Engine: A Case
for Contributory & Vicarious Liability
Prior to Title II, service providers facilitating ac-
ized sound recordings in their possession. See id. Addition-
ally, each defendant agreed to pay $100,000 in damages for
each infringed sound recording-totaling more than $1 mil-
lion against each defendant if further infringements took
place. See id.
234 See Antipiracy, supra note 232. In late 1997, the RIAA
charted a "growing trend of unauthorized pre-released re-
cordings offered for download on the Internet" available
through MP3 sites which can contain hundreds of different,
unauthorized copyrighted sound recordings that can be
downloaded in a matter of minutes. Id. The MP3 technology
is an advanced compression technology that allows users to
download and, in some cases, upload hundreds of full-
length, near CD-quality sound recordings without the per-
mission of the copyright holder. See id.
235 Alexandra Walsh, RJAA Statement on the Lycos MP3
Search Engine (visited Feb. 1, 1999) <http://www.riaa.com>.
We have communicated with Lycos about their new MP3
search engine, and they have committed to work with us
to develop procedures to eliminate infringing sites from
their directory. They also indicated their intent to fulfill
their obligations under the newly enacted Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, which requires them to take action
cess to illegal MP3 files through their services
(such as IRC, FTP, BBSs and Usenet) would likely
have been evaluated under the Netcom "volition"
or intent standard for contributory infringement.
240 It is likely courts would consider the degree of
participation the service providers exeit in the ex-
change of files. Under a volition standard, if the
ISP simply provides access to infringing material
on the internet without knowledge of its content,
the necessary intent is missing.241 Therefore,
under the Netcom standard, ISPs simply exchang-
ing MP3 files via ISP services would not be directly
liable.242 Contributory or vicarious liability claims
are still viable if knowledge and substantial partici-
pation (contributory) or control and direct finan-
cial benefit (vicarious) can be proven.
Thus far, courts have failed to provide a suc-
cinct standard for determining the elements of
contributory and vicarious liability in the online
environment. Differences in decisions concern-
ing the level of conduct necessary to constitute
"inducing, causing or materially contributing" 243
to the directly infringing activity have rendered
great incertitude in the law regarding service pro-
vider infringement liability.2 4 4 To date, no U.S.
court has handled a copyright infringement case
questioning the liability of a service provider for
linking to copyright infringing material, as the
MP3 search engine.2 45 Lycos' MP3 Search En-
gine, however, may prove to be the impetus for
such action.
whenever they become aware of an infringing musical
recording.
Id.
236 See Nelson, supra note 215, at 2.
237 See Lorek, supra note 19.
238 See Nelson, supra note 215, at 2. "We are not ex-
pected to legitimize text and prove that's copyrighted. We're
not expected to legitimize pictures that are out there and
prove that [they're] copyrighted." See id. at 2. (quoting Lycos
Product Manager Brian Kalinowski).
239 Lorek, supra note 19.
240 See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 See discussion, supra Section I (defining contributory
infringement).
244 See supra n.103 (providing online copyright infringe-
ment case synopsis discussing various liability holdings).
245 The RIAA has only threatened suing Lycos for its
MP3 search engine, however, the International Federation of
the Phonographic Industries (IFPI) filed a complaint against
the Lycos search engine in Olso, Norway on March 25, 1999.
See Chris Nelson, Record Industry Files Criminal Action Against
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4. Establishing Lycos' Knowledge of Copyright
Infringing Song Files
Proving actual knowledge in the MP3 context
would be difficult because the nature of the serv-
ices that most commonly facilitate file transfers,
such as IRC, are "real time." IRC does not pro-
vide the opportunity to discover the infringement
or notify the proper authorities before the in-
fringement has been removed or can be stopped.
Proving constructive knowledge and substantial
participation, however, would likely be a less
daunting task. Importantly, the initial decisions
prior to Title II did not require the knowledge el-
ement to be "actual" knowledge, only "construc-
tive." 2 4 6 Depending on the facts of the case, the
court determined whether the knowledge pos-
sessed by the ISP was sufficient to warrant liabil-
ity.24 7
For example, in the Webbworld and Hardenbaugh
cases, the courts found the defendant service
providers liable for subscribers' infringements be-
cause adult images were likely to include copy-
righted Playboy images.2 48 In fact, the court deter-
mined in both cases due to Playboy's prominence
in promulgating adult images, the ISP could be
considered to have had constructive knowledge
that the images were Playboy copyrighted, there-
fore, actual knowledge was not necessary. 249 The
same constructive knowledge could be held
against providers of MP3 files. Lycos advertises
over 500,000 links to MP3 files. 250
Given the strong, publicized disapproval of
MP3 technology by the RIAA (which represents
the major labels controlling most mainstream mu-
MP3 Search Engine, SONICNET NEWS OF THE WORLD, (visited
Mar. 26, 1999) <http:www.sonicnet.com/news/articlel.
jhtmi?index=4>. The IFPI was quoted as saying
"MP3.Lycos.com infringes copyrights on a mass scale." Id.
The IFPI is based in Switzerland where it represents 1,300
record companies in 39 countries. Id.
246 The "actual" knowledge requirement versus "con-
structive" knowledge requirement was a major victory for
ISPs lobbying Title II. See discussion, supra n.181, and accom-
panying text.
247 See Weiskopf, supra note 24, at 28-30.
248 See Hardenbaugh, 982 F. Supp. 503 at 512-13;
Webbworld I, 991 F. Supp. at 543.
249 See id.
250 See Nelson, supra note 215.
251 See Michael Robertson, Lycos Gets Into MP3
Hotwater (visited Feb. 5, 1999) <http://www.mp3.com/
news/164.html>.
252 See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. "Indeed it would be diffi-
cult for the infringing activity t o take place in the massive
quantities alleged without the support services provided." Id.
sic), Lycos may be deemed to have "constructive
knowledge" that illegal links to copyrighted songs
exist on their system.2 51
5. Lycos' Participation and Control in Infringing
Activity
Following the Fonovisa court's reasoning that
providing sites or facilitates widely known by con-
sumers to be a location where infringing activity
occurs,
2 5 2 it appears MP3 facilitating services are
at risk to be considered participating in copyright
violations.
Lycos boasts that it employs a "team of people
looking for MP3 files all over the internet," imply-
ing that it is not passive in its information location
function. 253 The seeking out of these files should
be considered a form of active participation in in-
fringing activity which has been found to be
grounds for liability.254 Additionally, the site actu-
ally "rates" the files it lists in its database for ease
of accessibility. 255 If this is the case, Lycos could
face liability directly under Netcom for the "voli-
tion" it displays in seeking out files.2
56
6. Finding Lyocos' Direct Financial Benefit
Finally, applying the financial benefit and con-
trol elements of vicarious liability presents an
equally damaging case against Lycos. An argu-
ment could be posed that advertising revenues
that logically increase with the popularity of the
service create significant profit for the ISP.257 As
do all ISPs, Lycos generally posts advertisements
253 See id.
254 See Hardenbaugh, 982 F. Supp. 503 at 514; Webbworld I,
991 F. Supp. at 543.
255 Song Titles are rated using a "star" system. See Nel-
son, supra note 20. Lycos ranks the links according to ease of
access. See id. Because only a limited number of users may
link and download a file at one time, Lycos designed its
search engine to keep track of the most popular links and
notify users of the ones that will be most time-consuming and
difficult to download due to their popularity. See Lycos
homepage at <http://www.lycos.com>.
256 See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, at 1370. To prove a
direct infringement online, there must be an element of voli-
tion present to be held liable. See id.
257 See Leslie Walker, Sites Find New Ways to Profit, [here-
inafter Lycos Revenues] WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 25, 1999, at
El. Seventy percent of the 1998 projected $2 billion web ad-
vertising revenue went to the internet's top 10 sites. See id.
Microsoft's "Money Central" site draws nearly four million
visitors a month and collects "sizable advertising fees" in
large part because its content remains free. See id. Advertis-
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on every screen a consumer views. When a con-
sumer searches for MP3 files on Lycos, this gener-
ates advertising revenue through multiple screens
to benefit Lycos.258 Regarding the control ele-
ment, as stated by the Webbworld court, the rele-
vant issue is not whether Lycos controls individu-
als uploading and downloading infringing
material, but rather, their ability to control what
happens on their website.2 59
CONCLUSION: CREATING AN APPLICABLE
STANDARD
Although Title II was passed less than a year
ago, recent technological capabilities such as MP3
have created another insurrection for copyright
law. Service providers seeking to take advantage
of the Title II haze ought not to receive liability
protection for engaging in activity that was not
contemplated in writing the law. A separate,
more thorough standard should be devised to
cover ISPs furnishing services that knowingly facil-
itate the exchange of infringing material. As the
law is written today, identifying those services or
the level of knowledge necessary for accountabil-
ity is much too imprecise and, as demonstrated by
Lycos, subject to abuse.
In order to respect the intent of Title II, as well
as the efforts of the courts to devise standards that
accommodate ISPs who unknowingly disseminate
infringing material, any new standard developed
for analyzing services provided must avoid alter-
ing the flexibility given to ISPs when applying
copyright infringement analysis. The standard
should only affect ISPs who knowingly attempt to
circumvent the otherwise effective Title II. By
combining portions of Title II that resemble the
knowledge and substantial participation elements
of contributory infringement with the direct fi-
nancial benefit and control elements of vicarious
infringement, ISPs subject to all four restrictions
could not find shelter under the liability limita-
tions of Title II.
Under this standard, it is likely Lycos' MP3
search engine would not qualify for a Title II lia-
bility limitation. With respect to the knowledge
ing revenues are projected to comprise 14 percent of the
2002 $55.6 billion internet consumer economy. See id.
258 See Lycos Reports Second Quarter Revenues Up 142%,
BUSINESS WIRE, Feb. 25, 1999. Lycos experienced a 142 per-
cent increase in revenues during the second quarter of the
1999 fiscal year from the same time period last year. See id.
element, the fact that the majority of MP3 files
available on the internet are illegal according to
the RIAA places Lycos on notice that many of
their files are copyright infringements. "Appar-
ent" knowledge should be clarified and expanded
beyond the obvious. An expansion of the "red
flag" tests suggested in Title II legislative history
would allow for the consideration of the RAA's
statistics and warnings as "red flags" and impart
knowledge on the ISPs providing links.
Substantial participation and control are likely
to be found where Lycos employs people to ac-
tively seek MP3 files on the internet and create
links to the sites that host them. This is exactly
the "volitional" element the Netcom court referred
to when it pioneered the first set of ISP copyright
infringement liability standards. As the court
wisely noted, there is a difference between an ISP
automatically allowing information to be passed
through its system and an ISP picking and choos-
ing what information it will store on its system.
While Lycos claims it is not technically storing ille-
gal files, Lycos users are only a click of the mouse
away from thousands of illegal files it clearly
"picks and chooses." The distinction between
storing and linking is non-existent to the average
user. The use of employees to actively seek, cate-
gorize and rate MP3 files would meet the average
person's standard for both participation and con-
trol.
Finally, the increased traffic the MP3 search en-
gine has generated due to its ease in locating MP3
song files arguably makes its advertising space
more valuable, thus creating a direct financial
benefit. While courts typically require the finan-
cial benefit be directly derived from the infring-
ing activity, it must be recognized that, at least
presently, advertising is perhaps the most lucra-
tive source of revenue for ISPs. The more people
that visit a site increases that site's value to pro-
spective advertisers. Because proving all four por-
tions of the test would be extremely difficult, only
those ISPs grossly abusing liability limitations set
forth in Title II would be in danger of losing the
exemption.
Under this hybrid contributory-vicarious liabil-
The company reported 39 percent growth in traffic to 50 mil-
lion page views daily. See id. Lycos CEO Edward N. Philip
commented "The ability to monetize our traffic growth
through value-added advertising and commerce platforms is
evidenced by our strong revenue growth." Id.
259 See Webbworld, 968 F. Supp. at 1177.
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ity standard, services linking to infringing mate-
rial such as Lycos' MP3 search engine would not
be able to escape liability on a statutory technical-
ity. Proving all four requirements would be ardu-
ous enough to preserve the ISP functions Con-
gress intended to protect, while shutting the door
on the others.
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